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NOTE
LOVE LIES BLEEDING: BROWNFIELDS IN THE
NEW MILLENNIUM
Leonard 0. Townsend
What went wrong at Love Canal was not the way Hooker had
disposed of the waste material but what happened to the property
during the following 25 years when Hooker no longer owned or
had any management responsibility over the property.'
If you take the Military Highway ... from Buffalo to Lewiston, you
will pass through a formidable wasteland. Landfills stretch in all
directions where enormous trucks - tiny in that landscape -
incessantly deposit sludge, which great bulldozers, like yellow ants,
then push into the ground. These machines are the only signs of
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life, for in the miasma that hangs in the air, no birds, not even
scavengers, are seen. Along colossal power lines that crisscross
this dismal land, the dynamos at Niagara push electric power
south, where factories have fled, leaving their remains to decay. To
drive along this road is to feel the awe and sense of mystery one
experiences in the presence of so much energy and so much
decadence.2
INTRODUCTION
The events occurring in Love Canal, New York during the late
1970's and early 1980's had all the elements of a made-for-
television movie? From community relocation, to chromosomal
damage, to the taking of hostages, Love Canal, a suburb near
Niagra Falls, New York, all too clearly demonstrated the suffering
that can arise from the irresponsible co-mingling of hazardous
waste and human beings.4 The result was that by 1990, "the state
and Federal governments [had] spent some $275 million studying
the site, cleaning it up and buying homes abandoned by residents."5
The Love Canal debacle originated in the 1930's "when Hooker
Chemicals and Plastic Corp. loaded its industrial waste into metal
2. MARK SAGOFF, THE ECONOMY OF THE EARTH: PHILOSOPHY,
LAW AND THE ENVIRONMENT 25 (1988).
3. See WILLIAM H. RODGERS, JR., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 682
(2d ed., 1994).
4. For example, on August 2, 1978, New York Health
Commissioner, Robert Whalen, announced that "there was a health
'emergency' at Love Canal involving a 'great and imminent peril to the
health of the general public."' MAZUR, supra note 1, at 14. On August 7,
1978, N.Y. Governor Hugh Carey "promised that the state would
purchase those houses [abutting the original Love Canal]. Two days later
the White House announced its support for relocation." Id. at 14-15. In
response to the release of a previously undisclosed EPA study that
found chromosome damage in eleven of thirty-six Love Canal
residents who had been tested ... EPA representatives flew to
Niagara Falls to belatedly explain the test results. They found
an enraged community on the verge of riot. This anger came
to a head on May 19, [1980] when homeowners, led by Lois
Gibbs, took two EPA officials hostage as a means of
pressuring the White House to provide relief.
Id. at 15.
5. Philip Shabecoff, Government Says Abandoned Love Canal
Homes are Safe Now, N.Y. TIMES May 15, 1990, at B4.
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drums and buried them."6 In the early 1950's, the company sold the
land containing the metal drums and the parcel was deeded to the
Niagara Falls Board of Education, which built a school and allowed
developers to construct homes adjacent to the site.' Rain eventually
penetrated the soil around the drums and in 1976, residents began
noticing a stench and oozing slime.' Several children were born
with birth defects to families living on one particular block, and
adults residing nearby reported liver maladies and nervous
disorders.9 It was discovered that the toxic waste from the metal
drums had leaked, seeping into the basements of area houses, ° and
the waste was blamed for a high rate of birth defects and cancer."
The State of New York declared a health emergency and evacuated
200 families. 2 Hooker Chemicals Company was later sued for both
cleanup costs and punitive damages. 3
While some commentators have stated that "Love Canal was the
impetus behind the Superfund law (CERCLA) that President Carter
signed in 1980,"' in truth, "the Superfund law was well along the
evolutionary path towards enactment before Love Canal burst into
public prominence."' 5 Despite the enactment of the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act of
198016 ("CERCLA" or "Superfund") and the events at Love Canal,
the country is still plagued by brownfields." A brownfield site is
6. James N. Baker & John J. Krieger, Update: Labors of Love,
NEWSWEEK, Dec. 11, 1978, at 16, 18.
7. See id. at 18.
8. See id.
9. See id.
10. See, e.g., Dick Kirschten, The New War on Pollution is Over
the Land, NAT'L J., Apr. 14, 1979, at 603, 605.
11. See id; see also H. James Saxton, N.Y. Times Abstracts, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 24, 1978, at 16.
12. See Margot Homblower, EPA Proposes Regulations On
Toxic Substances Disposal, THE WASH. POST, Dec. 15, 1978, at A2.
13. See United States v. Hooker Chems. & Plastics Corp., 850 F.
Supp. 993 (W.D.N.Y. 1994).
14. MAZUR, supra note 1, at 217.
15. RODGERS, supra note 3, at 682.
16. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1994).
17. See EPA, BROWNFIELDS ECONOMIC REDEVELOPMENT
INITIATIVE, QUICK REFERENCE FACT SHEET 1 (Oct. 2000) [hereinafter
ECONOMIC REDEVELOPMENT INITIATIVE], at http://www.epa.gov/sweros
ps/bf/pdf/econinit.pdf.
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"[a]ny real property where the actual or suspected presence of
contamination is an impediment to redevelopment."8 Academic
commentators have argued that the large number of brownfields 9
in New York State and in the country today is due to the fact that
CERCLA works almost too well.2" CERCLA has draconian liability
jaws that tend to scare away potential developers and purchasers
who might otherwise utilize sites where hazardous waste is
present.2 In addition to CERCLA, "[t]here is a confusing labyrinth
of overlapping federal and state statutes and regulations"
addressing how and when the cleanup of brownfield sites must be
executed.22 "This lack of [statutory] clarity has resulted in cleanup
decisions being made on a site-by-site basis, producing a system
that is neither transparent nor predictable."23 Because of this lack of
clarity, the debate over how best to approach the problem of
brownfields rages on.
Although a great deal of information regarding brownfields is
available, it seems a significant amount of this information in terms
18. THE BROWNFIELDS COALITION, FINAL REPORT 2 (1999)
[hereinafter FINAL REPORT], at http://www-l.nysba2.Org/sections/enviro
n/coalitionCoalitio.pdf.
19. See Keith Schneider, US. Said to Lack Data on Threat Posed
by Hazardous Waste Sites, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 22, 1991, at C5 (reporting
that as of 1991, more than 1,100 of the country's worst hazardous waste
sites remained to be cleaned up); see also Linda Kanamine, Groups Seek
Review of Toxic 'Malpractice, 'USA TODAY, July 1, 1992, at 9A (stating
that "[n]early one person in six lives within four miles of a present or
former toxic waste site.").
20. See, e.g., RODGERS, supra note 3, at 58 (discussing
Superfund as "a liability regime that is without parallel in U.S. domestic
law."); but see Heidi Gorovitz Robertson, One Piece of the Puzzle: Why
State Brownfields Programs Can't Lure Businesses to the Urban Cores
Without Finding the Missing Pieces, 51 RUTGERS L. REV. 1075, 1084
(1999) (stating CERCLA alone is not responsible for the country's
numerous orphaned brownfields as "[t]he abandonment and
deindustrialization of many urban cores began long before CERCLA and
the state Superfund laws.").
21. See Robertson, supra note 20, at 1083.
22. THE BROWNFIELDS COALITION, SUMMARY OF LEGISLATIVE
PROPOSAL 1 (last modified Jan. 21, 2000) [hereinafter SUMMARY OF
LEGISLATIVE PROPOSAL], in FORDHAM ENVTL. L.J., Symposium 2000
CLE Manual, Earth, Wind and Fire: Brownfields in the Coming
Millennium § 7 (Mar. 22, 2000) (on file with the FORDHAM ENVTL. L.J.).
23. SUMMARY OF LEGISLATIVE PROPOSAL, supra note 22, at 2.
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of solutions, is rhetoric. These solutions may seem convincing at
first glance, but once subject to careful consideration, they prove to
be unworkable. This article suggests several new ways of
considering solutions to the brownfields crisis within an urban
context. Part I provides a brief analysis of the statutory and
common law framework under CERCLA that is relevant to
brownfields. Part II contains observations for considering
brownfields in the urban context and discusses why brownfields are
currently underutilized. Part III suggests new directions regarding
liability for cleanup of these sites and provides a moral analysis of
the brownfields dilemma. In order to better illustrate these new
directions, I have created a hypothetical case in Part IV, entitled,
6,000 Parcels v. People of the City of New York. 4 Finally, Part V
explores the future of brownfields in the urban arena.
I. STATUTORY AND COMMON LAW FOUNDATIONS
New York State sued Hooker Chemicals Company in 1979 for
negligence and punitive damages, even though the company had
24. The name "6,000 Parcels" is based on information from two
experts in the field, Annette Barbaccia and Jody Kass. See E-mail from
Annette Barbaccia, Director of Mayor's Office of Environmental
Coordination, to the author (July 20, 2000) (on file with author).
We don't have an actual list of brownfield sites, but we
estimate that there are between 5,000 to 6,000 vacant
industrial sites within the City of New York. This is based on
secondary sources of data from 1997, such as land use,
zoning, tax data, etc .... The sites vary in size from 500 sq.
ft. to hundreds of acres. The basis of our effort in 1997 was to
get a macro-level perspective on the extent of the issue and
the areas of the city that we should target our efforts.
Id.; see also E-mail from Jody Kass, Director of Regulatory Initiatives,
New York City Partnership, to the author (July 18, 2000) (on file with
author).
There is no exact number [of brownfields sites] for either the
City or the State. And, there is a lot of controversy over
identifying/listing sites -- for fear of stigmatization.
Nevertheless, the City has estimated that there are about
6,000 vacant and abandoned sites (representing 3,500 to 4,000
acres) that are zoned industrial. One can presume that these
sites have some contamination, which is surely an impediment
to reuse . . . . There are also many, many commercial and
residential sites in NYC that have the vestiges of previous
uses or illegal dumping where the contamination is an
obstacle. There are no estimates on the number of these sites.
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not owned the Love Canal property since 1954.25 New York State
had the ability to bring this action pursuant to CERCLA,26 which is
triggered whenever "any hazardous substance is released or there is
a substantial threat of such a release into the environment. 2 7
CERCLA's framework is unique among environmental statutes
because it relies on federal common law to provide gap fillers.28
This reliance on federal common law has made CERCLA "the
legal equivalent of a termite colony-undergoing constant
structural change as a result of the aggregation of local
endeavors."29 Premised on the concept of shovels first, lawyers
later,
[i]t appears that with the dangers or potential dangers
caused by hazardous substances, shooting first and asking
questions later was the intent of Congress, making it clear
that under CERCLA the EPA should have and has full
reign to conduct or mandate uninterrupted cleanups for the
benefit of the environment and the populus. 3
0
CERCLA prescribes first cleaning up the hazardous contaminants
by any means necessary (including attaching liability to force past
and present owners and operators to pay for the cleanup of a site)
and only then allowing judicial review to correct any inequities.3
25. See United States v. Hooker Chems. & Plastics Corp., 850 F.
Supp. 993, 997-98 (W.D.N.Y. 1994).
26. See 42 U.S.C. § 9613 (1994); New York v. Shore Realty
Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1040 (2d Cir. 1985) ("CERCLA . . . applies
'primarily to the cleanup of leaking inactive or abandoned sites and to
emergency responses to spills."' (footnote omitted)).
27. 42 U.S.C. § 9604(a)(1) (1994).
28. See United States v. Aceto Agric. Chems. Corp., 699 F.
Supp. 1384, 1390 (S.D. Iowa 1988) (finding "that where the statutory
language and legislative history of CERCLA are inconclusive and the
legislative history shows that the common law was intended to fill such
gaps, the common law is a proper source of guidance.").
29. RODGERS, supra note 3, at 683.
30. B.R. McKay & Sons, Inc. v. United States, 633 F. Supp.
1290, 1294 (D. Utah 1986).
31. See 42 U.S.C. § 9613(h) (1994); Voluntary Purchasing Group
v. Reilly, 889 F.2d 1380, 1387-88 (5th Cir. 1989) ("CERCLA explicitly
limits judicial review of remedial and removal plans where such review
will delay cleanup." (footnote omitted)).
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These cleanups, if necessary, may initially be paid for out of a fund
financed by industry taxes.32
CERCLA defines the term "hazardous substance" and requires
that the government be notified when a release of such substances
occurs.3 3 The notice provision provides, in part:
any person in charge of a vessel or an offshore or an
onshore facility shall, as soon as he has knowledge of any
release (other than a federally permitted release) of a
hazardous substance from 'such vessel or facility in
quantities equal to or greater than those determined
pursuant to section 9602 of this title, immediately notify
the National Response Center established under the Clean
Water Act.
34
Failure to notify the National Response Center may result in both
criminal35 and civil liability. 36
When notified of a release, the Environmental Protection Agency
("EPA") performs its own analysis, has a right of access to the
facility, and is
authorized to act, consistent with the national contingency
plan, to remove or arrange for the removal of, and provide
for remedial action relating to such hazardous substance,
pollutant, or contaminant at any time (including its
removal from any contaminated natural resource), or take
any other response measure consistent with the national
contingency plan.
37
If the EPA determines that a site merits cleanup, it can perform the
cleanup itself, or can direct a responsible party to perform it.38 The
32. See 126 Cong. Rec. 26,338 (1980) (statement of Rep. Florio)
("It is wholly appropriate and equitable for the industries which have
benefited most directly from cheap, inadequate disposal practices, and
which have generated the wastes which imposed the risks on society to
contribute a substantial portion of the response costs.").
33. See 42 U.S.C. § 9601(14) (1994).
34. Id. § 9603(a) (citation omitted).
35. See id. § 9603(b).
36. See id. §§ 9609(a)-(b).
37. Id. § 9604(a)(1).
38. See id. § 9604(a)(1).
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EPA may seek a private solution before undertaking a cleanup, but
is not required to do so.
3 9
CERCLA is often perceived as an unforgiving measure that
operates in counter-intuitive fashion because of its awesome
liability jaws." Liability for cleanup costs may attach to present
owners and operators,41 lessees, 42 generators, 13 and past owners."
39. See, e.g., United States v. Miami Drum Servs. Inc., No. 85-
0038, mem. op., 1986 WL 15327, at *10, 25 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA)
1469, 17 Envt'l L. Rep. (Envt'l. L. Inst.) 20539 (S.D. Fla. 1986) (holding
that "[a] reading of [CERCLA] so as to require the government to contact
all potentially responsible parties and attempt to work out a private party
cleanup would seriously undermine the expeditious cleanup of toxic
waste sites.").
40. See RODGERS, supra note 3, at 58.[T]he Superfund law is best known for a strict and
unforgiving liability imposed upon many powerful (and quite
surprised entities)--banks that have taken over properties to
protect a security interest, corporations with subsidiaries that
own polluted properties, unlucky buyers of commercial real
estate, chemical and aerospace companies whose wastes were
shipped to a dump site years ago, and cities and
municipali t ies who are owners and operators of the locallandfilf.
Id. (citation omitted).
41. See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(1) (1994); New York v. Shore
Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1044 (2d Cir. 1985).
Congress intended to cover different classes of persons
differently. Section 9607(a)(1) applies to all current owners
and operators, while section 960 7(a)(2) primarily covers prior
owners and operators . . . . Prior owners and operators are
liable only if they owned or operated the facility 'at the time
of disposal of any hazardous substance'; this limitation does
not apply to current owners.
Id.
42. See Nurad, Inc. v. William E. Hooper & Sons Co., 966 F.2d
837, 843 (4th Cir. 1992) (finding that "a defendant operates a 'facility'
only if it has authority to control the area where the hazardous substances
were located." Thus, "while liability under § 9607(a)(2) is strict . . . it
nonetheless extends only to those who have authority over the area where
hazardous substances are stored." Id. (citation omitted)).
43. See United States v. Wade, 577 F. Supp. 1326, 1333 (E.D.
Pa. 1983). CERCLA
appears to be imposing liability on a generator who has (1)
disposed of its hazardous substances (2) at a facility which
now contains hazardous substances of the sort disposed of by
the generator (3) if there is a release of that or some other
type of hazardous substance (4) which causes the incurrence
of response costs.
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Liability is usually strict,45 in addition to joint and several.46 It may
extend from a subsidiary to a parent company,47 from a predecessor
to a successor company,48 and may even pierce the corporate veil to
Id.; see also United States v. Aceto Agric. Chems. Corp., 872 F.2d 1373
(8th Cir. 1989) (finding since ownership of the hazardous substance had
not passed to the formulator, and since spillage was an inherent part
result of the manufacturing process, liability should attach to the
generator).
44. See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(2) (1994); Nurad 966 F. 2d at 846
("The trigger to liability under [42 U.S.C.] § 9607(a)(2) is ownership or
operation of a facility at the time of disposal, not culpability or
responsibility for the contamination.").
45. See, e.g., In re Bell Petroleum Servs., Inc., 3 F.3d 889, 897
(5th Cir. 1993).
CERCLA is a strict liability statute, one of the purposes of
which is to shift the cost of cleaning up environmental harm
from the taxpayers to the parties who benefited from the
disposal of the wastes that caused the harm . . . . "Often,
liability is imposed upon entities for conduct predating the
enactment of CERCLA, and even for conduct that was not
illegal, unethical, or immoral at the time it occurred.
Id. (citation omitted).
46. See United States v. Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802,
807 (S.D. Ohio 1983) ("The fact that the term joint and several liability
was deleted from a prior draft of the bill . . . in and of itself, is not
dispositive of the scope of liability under CERCLA." (citation omitted));
Wade, 577 F. Supp. at 1338 (suggesting a presumption that "joint and
several liability should be imposed in cases brought under § [9607] of
CERCLA unless the defendants establish that a reasonable basis exists
for apportioning the harm amongst them.").
47. See United States v. Kayser-Roth Corp., 724 F. Supp. 15, 22
(D.R.I. 1989) (stating that the "parent corporation's control over the
subsidiary's management and operations is an essential element of
proving operator liability on the parent's part." (citation omitted)).
48. See United States v. Carolina Transformer Co., Inc., 739 F.
Supp. 1030, 1039 (E.D.N.C. 1989) (finding successor liability based on
the following factors: "[w]hether the business of both employers was the
same, whether the employees of the new company were doing the same
job, and whether the new company produced the same product for
essentially the same customers." (citations omitted)). But see United
States v. Mex. Feed and Seed Co., Inc., 980 F.2d 478, 489 (8th Cir. 1992)
(finding liability did not pass to a successor company because the
successor did not "continue" the business). The successor company did
not consist solely of the former company's assets; the successor company
was a
larger, pre-existing corporation, which bought [the former
company's] assets in an arm's-length transaction in order to
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hold corporate officers and employees liable.49 Liability may also
pass to a mortgagee," or a secured creditor." As if this were not
formidable enough, the Internal Revenue Service has ruled, and
various courts have held, that the costs associated with cleaning up
a contaminated site are not deductible repairs, but must be
capitalized and depreciated. 2 Even with CERCLA's strict liability
service one of its several re-refineries and, [the successor
company] had no knowledge of the offending tanks nor [at the
time of the transaction] had [the former company] been
identified as a potentially responsible party for CFRCLA
purposes in regard to the tanks.
Id.
49. See 42 U.S.C. § 9601(21) (1994); United States v. N.E.
Pharm. & Chem. Co., 810 F.2d 726, 745 (8th Cir. 1986) (stating that
"imposing liability upon only the corporation, but not those corporate
officers and employees who actually make corporate decisions, would be
inconsistent with Congress' intent to impose liability upon the persons
who are involved in the handling and disposal of hazardous substances."
(citations omitted)).
50. See, e.g., United States v. Md. Bank & Trust Co., 632 F.
Supp. 573, 579 (D.Md. 1986) (stating that in order to impose CERCLA
liability on a secured creditor, the security interest in the property "must
exist at the time of the clean-up.").
51. See, e.g., United States v. Fleet Factors Corp., 901 F.2d 1550,
1558 (1 1th Cir. 1990) (finding that "a secured creditor will be liable if its
involvement with the management of the facility is sufficiently broad to
support the inference that it could affect hazardous waste disposal if it so
chose." (footnote omitted)).
52. See, e.g., INDOPCO v. Comm'r, 112 S. Ct. 1039, 1042
(1992) (stating while 26 U.S.C. § 162(a) "allows the deduction of 'all the
ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year
in carrying on any trade or business,"' it "allows no deduction for a
capital expenditure -- an 'amount paid out for new buildings or for
permanent improvements or betterments made to increase the value of
any property or estate."' (citations omitted)); Elliott Milhollin, Note,
Taxation of Superfund Cleanup Costs: How the IRS Continues to
Frustrate CERCLA's Twin Policy Goals, 5 WIs. ENVTL. L.J. 213, 214-15
(1998).
The IRS examines superfund cleanup costs like any other
business expense. It does not take into account the effect its
ruling might have on how soon the site is cleaned up, and on
who will ultimately pay for the cleanup. Given the -high cost
of remediation efforts under CERCLA, the tax consequences
of being able to deduct superfund cleanup costs in the current
year may be quite significant.
Id. (footnote omitted); Glenn R. Carrington & Robert A. Kilinsikis, Tax
Treatment of Environmental Remediation Costs, 437 PRACTICING LAW
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standard, brownfields continue to plague the national landscape,
with no consistent natural solution in place to address the statute's
shortcomings.
II. WHY ARE BROWNFIELDS BROWN AND WHO IS TO BLAME?
The Environmental Protection Agency historically utilized
Superfund monies to clean up sites that are on the National
Priorities List ("NPL").53 As the level of contamination at
brownfields sites however, is usually far below what would cause a
INSTITUTE, TAx LAW AND ESTATE PLANNING COURSE HANDBOOK
SERIES 55, 59 (Feb.-Mar. 1999).
The IRS first addressed the deductibility of these expenditures
in two published technical advice memoranda (TAMs) -- one
on soil remediation for PCB contamination and the other on
asbestos. The analysis in the TAMs was based on whether the
costs are similar to deductible 'incidental repair' costs or
whether they are 'capital improvement or betterment' costs.
The TAMs held the latter in both situations and generated
numerous letters from Congress and taxpayers requesting that
the Service reconsider its positions. In response to those
requests, the IRS set up a task force made up of IRS and
Treasury personnel to consider the deductibility of
environmental cleanup costs. The Service later issued a
second TAM on asbestos holding that costs were capitalizable
where asbestos was removed, but were deductible where
asbestos was encapsulated. The IRS also issued Rev. Rul. 94-
38 holding that certain soil and groundwater remediation costs
may be deducted. While Rev. Rul. 94-38 defused much of the
controversy surrounding the soil remediation TAM, extensive
controversy still exists with respect to asbestos removal and
storage tank removal costs.
Id. Thus, the IRS may be changing their "legislative grace" (as
deductions are referred to in Interstate Transit Lines v. Comm'r, 319 U.S.
590, 593 (1943)) to allow Brownfield Empowerment Zones to deduct
clean up costs rather than to capitalize them.
53. See Eagle-Pitcher Indus., Inc. v. EPA, 759 F.2d 922, 932
(D.C. Cir. 1985).
[T]he NPL is not in itself remedial action-inclusion on the
NPL requires no cleanup nor any other action by site owners.
Instead, the NPL is simply a rough list of priorities,
assembled quickly and inexpensively to comply with
Congress' mandate for the agency to take action straightaway.
Utilizing the NPL, EPA will thereafter perform in-depth
examinations of each site on the list to determine whether
remedial action is necessary. If EPA determines at that later
stage that the release of a 'pollutant or contaminant' at a
particular site does not present 'an imminent and substantial
danger,' then no remedial action will be taken.
Id. (footnote omitted).
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site to be listed on the NPL, brownfields have the unique
distinction of attracting CERCLA liability without access to
Superfund money.14 While a unanimous definition of a brownfield
has yet to emerge, most parties involved in the debate over
brownfields would concede that far too many orphaned sites
remain fallow.5" In contrast, greenfield sites continue to be
developed. 6 This trend may exacerbate the problems of undersized,
and perhaps outdated, public transportation systems, lead to lower
tax revenues, and contribute to urban sprawl and decentralization.
Brownfields are often situated in ideal locations, accessible to
major transportation routes and near large potential workforces 8
Yet developers regularly choose more remote sites on which to
develop industrial or commercial facilities because, as greenfields
54. Id.
55. See Robertson, supra note 20, at 7.
56. See Walter E. Mugdan, EPA's Role in Brownfields
Development, SE55 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 75, 77 (Feb. 9, 2000) ("Due in part to
the risks associated with brownfields, developers have turned instead to
'greenfields,' land previously undeveloped (or used for agricultural
purposes).").
57. See Robertson, supra note 20, at 1079 (stating that
brownfields "affect[] the economic viability of the communities in which
they are located. Brownfields drive down surrounding property values
and the local tax base, provide no employment to local residents, and
constitute blights on communities." (footnotes omitted)); Suzannah
Lessard, Critique, 188 ARCHITECTURAL REc. 55 (Aug. 2000).
The most confounding aspect of sprawl is not that it turns the
American Dream into a nightmare, or that it generates traffic
congestion that only increases as more roas are built, but
rather that sprawl dissolves the distinction between city and
country .... Even more devastating .... [is] that sprawl, in
its latest permutation, is no longer necessarily contingent on
cities at all.
Id.; William W. Buzbee, Urban Sprawl, Federalism, and the Problem of
Institutional Complexity, 68 FORDHAM L. REv. 57, 59 (1999).
Urban sprawl causes many direct and indirect societal and
environmental harms. sprawling metropolitan development
requires substantial new infrastructure investments by all
levels of government and generally requires more costly
infrastructure investments than more concentrated forms of
development. Urban sprawl also threatens biodiversity and
contributes to transportation-caused air pollution and the
deterioration of river water quality as development destroys
green areas, displaces agricultural uses, creates impervious
surfaces and adds to river discharges.
Id. (footnote omitted).
58. See, e.g., Robertson, supra note 20, at 1078-79.
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(which are outside CERCLA's fearsome liability), they are
unaffected by the ambiguities inherent in CERCLA liability. 9
When a developer purchases a brownfield site, he or she becomes a
present owner, and is liable for all costs pertaining to the cleanup. 0
In order for an owner to theoretically avoid this burden, CERCLA
has provided what is called the "innocent purchaser defense."'" In a
commercial sales transaction, if the purchaser had no reason to
know contaminants were present on the property, the purchaser
may escape liability for cleanup of these contaminants.62 This
breaks down since brownfield sites, by definition, have some
degree of contamination. Such contamination should be detected if
the site has been inspected during an appropriate inquiry. However,
even performing a detailed inspection may not shield the developer
from liability,63 because by conducting all appropriate inquiry, the
developer has reason to know of the contamination, and therefore
should be liable. Consequently, it seems illogical for a developer to
buy property where it will incur the additional financial burden of
cleaning up a previous owner's contamination.' Furthermore, even
if a developer undertakes this additional burden, there may exist
59. See, e.g., United States v. Mottolo, 605 F. Supp. 898, 902
(D.N.H., 1985) ("CERCLA has acquired a well-deserved notoriety for
vaguely-drafted provisions and an indefinite, if not contradictory,
legislative history." (citations omitted)).
60. See RODGERS, supra note 3, at 59 (pointing out that in the
case of an EPA-administered cleanup, "[s]ome of the government
cleanups have been so expensive and so incompetently conducted as to
encourage many private parties to do the job before the government does
it for them at twice or three times the cost.").
61. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35)(A)-(C) (1994).
62. See id. § 9601(35)(B).
63. See ROBERT V. PERCIVAL, ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL
REGULATION: LAW, SCIENCE, AND POLICY 299 (2d ed., 1996) (noting
that courts have not precisely interpreted the parameters of "all
appropriate inquiry").
64. See RODGERS, supra note 3, at 59.
The strict-liability approach of Superfund has shaken the
incentive structure of the private business world in ways
unimagined by traditional command-and-control regulation.
By casting such a wide liability net and deputizing so many
potential enforcers, Congress 'imposed a burden on the
business community to anticipate, avoid and clean up
environmental contamination that knows only ill-defined
limits.'
Id. (citation omitted).
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unforeseen contamination below the surface that could result in
future liability.65 Due to the challenges faced by potential
developers, we are left with the following brownfields dilemma:
there are many sites, often located in urban areas, where it is
difficult to find a purchaser willing to develop contaminated
property in light of CERCLA liability.6  These sites, in the absence
of contamination would be prime candidates for redevelopment,
producing needed taxes, housing, and social amenities for urban
areas.
67
Since it is normally very difficult to prove or disprove whether
contamination causes health problems,68 the better view is to
conclude that any contamination within is a clear and present
health danger or risk. Unfortunately, this risk is spread unevenly.
Brownfield sites often exist in close proximity to those who
consume the least and are least able to deal with potential health
and economic problems--the urban poor.69
The many brownfield sites must be cleaned up to prevent further
deterioration of our economic and physical health, yet no viable
industry exists which can finance such a cleanup. Paradoxically,
these same brownfield sites are usually located in areas least able to
deal with the situation. While in the past we may have successfully
avoided or sidestepped the problem of brownfields, it has finally
become a significant obstacle to the efficient functioning of our
society. In some sense, we have achieved the nightmare that Garrett
Hardin presaged in his essay entitled The Tragedy of the Commons.
65. See, e.g., O'Neil v. Picillo, 883 F.2d 176, 183 (1st Cir. 1989)
(holding, in response to the defendant's argument that it was not liable
for any future remedial action because the state had not shown that any
work will be needed, that "[w]e see no problem with the court [below]
giving the state (and EPA) time to conduct further tests. If after
conducting the necessary tests, the government concludes that there was
in fact no harm to the area's groundwater, then [defendants] will have
nothing to worry about.").
66. See Robertson, supra note 20, at 1084.
67. See id. at 1079.
68. See, e.g., PERCIVAL, supra note 63, at 160 (highlighting
"enormous uncertainties concerning the sources and impacts of various
pollutants.").
69. See id. at 446 ("Race proved to be the most significant among
variables tested in association with the location of commercial hazardous
waste facilities, with household income being second.").
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In a reverse way, the tragedy of the commons reappears in
problems of pollution. Here it is not a question of taking
something out of the commons, but of putting something
in-sewage, or chemical, radioactive, and heat wastes into
water; noxious and dangerous fumes into the air; and
distracting and unpleasant advertising signs into the line of
sight. The calculations of utility are much the same as
before. The rational man finds that his share of the cost of
the wastes he discharges into the commons is less than the
cost of purifying his wastes before releasing them. Since
this is true for everyone, we are locked into a system of
"fouling our own nest," so long as we behave only as
independent, rational, free-enterprisers.
70
Now that we have succeeded in "fouling our own nest," what
model will we use to clean house?
III. NEW WAYS OF THINKING ABOUT THE BROWNFIELDS LIABILITY
ISSUE
As inhabitants of the earth, we theoretically have the right to
enjoy this planet and all of its beauty and wonder. With this right
also comes an obligation to care for it.7 This obligation may be
broken down into three legal concepts: stewardship, tenancy, and
trusteeship. If we owe duties under the principles of stewardship,
tenancy and trusteeship to future generations, and if brownfields
represent a disinheritance to future generations as well as a clear
and present economic and health danger, and further, if there are
none of the usual responsible parties available from whom to
demand cleanup costs, then liability for cleanup costs should shift
to the parties possessing the next level of control. In light of the
current brownfields situation, therefore, I suggest making "People
of the City of New York" defendants in a hypothetical lawsuit,
"6,000 Parcels v. People of the City of New York." This lawsuit is
designed to raise sufficient funds to clean up all brownfields sites
in the City of New York. Using various analogies to be explained
below, I propose shifting liability for the clean up to New York
70. Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 Sci. 1243,
1245 (1968).
71. See Edith Brown Weiss, Our Rights and Obligations to
Future Generations for the Environment, 84 AM. J. INT'L. L. 198, 203
(1990).
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City's citizens. In essence, in the words of Pogo, "[w]e have met
the enemy and he is us."72
Though humanity may not own the planet, it can be asserted that
we are its keepers. As bailees of this planet, we have "the rightfiul
possession of goods by one whom is not the owner."" As such, we
are responsible for accounting for or returning the item in the same
condition that we received it.74 The failure of previous bailees to
live up to their obligations does not give us the right to repeat their
failures. The obligation is imposed on us anew and the same
standard is set for each successive generation.
As tenants in possession of property, we are under an obligation
to keep the property in good condition and prevent it from
becoming unusable. "The gist of [this idea] is that the holder of the
present estate is to a considerable extent inhibited by the law of
waste from permanently damaging the land or things on it, i.e.,
from doing damage that will still be present when the landlord's
reversion becomes possessory."" This idea is present in the
writings of John Locke.
'[I]f gathering the acorns, or other fruits of the earth, etc.,
makes a right to them, then any one may ingross as much
as he will.' To which I answer: not so. The same law of
nature that does by this means give us property does also
bound that property, too ... As much as any one can make
use of to any advantage of life before it spoils, so much he
may by his labor fix a property in; whatever is beyond this
is more than his share and belongs to others.
76
Therefore, as tenants of this planet, we can change things so long
as the changes comport with the law of good husbandry and do not
amount to waste.77 Melms v. Pabst Brewing Co. adopted the
72. THE BEST OF POGO: COLLECTED FROM THE OKEFENOKEE
STAR 163 (Walt Kelly & Bill Crouch, Jr., eds., 1982) (emphasis added).
73. WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 1030 (Jaeger 3d ed., 1967).
74. The Winkfield (C.A. 1900-1903) All E.R. Rep. 346, 352.
75. ROGER A. CUNNINGHAM, ET AL., THE LAW OF PROPERTY
275 (2d ed., 1993).
76. JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF CIVIL
GOVERNMENT 19 (Thomas P. Peardon ed., 1952).
77. Melms v. Pabst Brewing Co., 79 N.W. 738, 740 (Wis. 1899).
Waste is
the principle that the reversioner or remainder-man is
ordinarily entitled to receive the identical estate, or, in other
words, that the identity of the property is not to be destroyed,
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doctrine of meliorating waste "which, without changing the legal
definition of waste, still allowed the tenant to change the course of
husbandry upon the estate if such change be for the betterment of
the estate. 78 Consequently, as tenants, we do have some discretion
to use the planet for our benefit, but we may not so radically
change it so that prohibitions under the doctrine of waste are
violated.
Humanity also holds a trusteeship for future generations,
triggering a duty to preserve the opportunity to benefit from the
planet. "All generations are inherently linked to other generations,
past and future, in using the common patrimony of the earth,"79 and
since we all have the right to equally share in the benefits of the
planet, this relationship may be termed a partnership. As partners,
we must preserve the environment for future generations to enjoy.
The obligation to protect the environment for future generations
is derived from ideas beyond stewardship, tenancy and trusteeship.
Several passages in the Old Testament have been interpreted by
scholars as broadly defining the relationship of man to his
environment. "[T]he first man and woman were 'blessed' by God
and ordered (or authorized) to '[b]e fruitful and multiply, and fill
the earth and subdue it,' and to have 'dominion' over other living
creatures."8 Indeed, God's covenant with Noah "was made 'with
still remains, and it has been said that changes in the nature of
buildings, though enhancing the value of the property, will
constitute waste if they change the identity of the estate.
Id.
78. Id. at 739.
79. Weiss, supra note 71, at 199.
80. Richard H. Hiers, Reverence for Life and Environmental
Ethics in Biblical Law and Covenant, 13 J.L. & RELIGION 127, 130
(quoting Gen. 1:26-28).
In recent years, many morally serious writers have urged that
Judaism and Christianity are to be blamed for the
contemporary environmental crisis because religious and non-
religious people throughout the world in ensuing centuries
allowed themselves to be guided by these and other biblical
mandates. This kind of complaint ails to take seriously the
biblical context in which the primordial pair were so
instructed. According to Genesis 1:26-28, only the aboriginal
man and woman were authorized to subdue the earth and have
dominion. Moreover, everything in Genesis one preceded the
time of the Great Flood (Gen. 6-9), after which the whole
structure of relations among humans, other creatures, and God
was altered radically. It therefore seems likely that these
889
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every living creature . . ., the birds, the cattle, and every beast of
the earth . . ., as many came out of the ark."' 8' The "implication of
this covenant is that all life forms were valued by God and that
human participants in the covenant should therefore affirm their
value as well."82
The Founding Fathers referred to our obligations to future
generations at the very beginning of the Constitution: "[w]e the
People of the United States, in order to form a more perfect Union,
establish justice . . . and secure the Blessings of Liberty to
ourselves and our Posterity .... "83 Distinguished jurists have also
occasionally addressed issues related to our obligations to the
environment. Justice Douglas' dissent in Sierra Club v. Morton84
comes tantalizingly close to suggesting that our role to husband
may have ended, and the environment should have its own standing
to sue its polluters and defilers.
The voice of the inanimate object, therefore, should not be
stilled. That does not mean that the judiciary takes over
the managerial functions from the federal agency. It
merely means that before these priceless bits of Americana
(such as a valley, an alpine meadow, a river, or a lake) are
forever lost or are so transformed as to be reduced to the
eventual rubble of our urban environment, the voice of the
existing beneficiaries of these environmental wonders
should be heard.85
In response to the Morton majority's reference to Alexis de
Tocqueville,86 Justice Blackmun quoted from John Donne with an
appropriate reference to our discussion.
commands were understood to have applied only to conditions
during that antediluvian era.
Id.
81. Id. at 136 (quoting 1 Gen. 9:9-10).
82. Id. at 137.
83. U.S. CONST. pmbl. Despite this obligation, courts have
unfortunately, never found a federal or state constitutional right to a clean
environment. See, e.g., Tanner v. Armco Steel Corp., 340 F. Supp. 532,
535 (S.D. Tex. 1972) ("The Ninth Amendment, through its 'penumbra' or
otherwise, embodies no legally assertable right to a healthful
environment." (citations omitted)).
84. 405 U.S. 727 (1972).
85. Id. at 749-50 (Douglas, J. dissenting).
86. See id. at 740-41 n. 16 (quoting ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, 1
DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 102 (1945)).
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No man is an Hand, intire of itselfe; every man is a peece
of the Continent, a part of the maine; if a Clod bee washed
away by the Sea, Europe is the lesse, as well as if a
Promontorie were, as well as if a Mannor of thy friends or
of thine owne were; any man's death diminishes me,
because I am involved in Mankinde; And therefore never
send to know for whom the bell tolls; it tolls for thee.
8 7
My analysis and proposal for addressing the brownfields crisis
begins with the question raised by Justice Blackmun in his Morton
dissent. "Must our law be so rigid and our procedural concepts so
inflexible that we render ourselves helpless when the existing
methods and the traditional concepts do not quite fit and do not
prove to be entirely adequate for new issues?"88
The existence of brownfields throughout the country can be seen
as antithetical to the legal, moral, and common sense principles
explored above. In the past, it has been easy for society to point its
collective finger at industry and scream 'you are to blame for
polluting our earth;' legislators then legislated, regulators then
regulated and industry then paid.89 Everyone, in the exhilaration of
finger pointing, neglected to note that what industry produces, it
produces in anticipation of what consumers want, from Frisbees to
refrigerators. If consumers did not purchase these products,
It will be seen, also, that by leaving it to private interest to
censure the law, and by intimately uniting the trial of the law
with the trial of an individual, legislation is protected from
wanton assaults and from the daily aggressions of party spirit.
The errors of the legislator are exposed only to meet a real
want; and it is always a positive and appreciable fact that
must serve as the basis of a prosecution.
Id.
87. Morton, 405 U.S. at 760 n.2 (quoting JOHN DONNE,
DEVOTIONS XVII).
88. Id. at 755-56 (Blackmun, J. dissenting).
89. See BRUCE YANDLE, THE POLITICAL LIMITS OF
ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: TRACKING THE UNICORN 119 (1989).
As currently constituted, Superfund and CERCLA make an
attractive politician's pork barrel. Demand for EPA's services
far exceeds supply. Politicians can put on shining armor and
make a name tor themselves with the homefolks by bringing
home the bacon. But unlike traditional pork barrel projects
(like dams, canals, bridges, and roads), whether justified or
not, Superfund sites stir a deep emotion among people who
live near them.
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industry might very well produce less pollution.9" What has
happened in the brownfields arena is unique in that society can no
longer point a finger at industry, because the particular industry
that contaminated the brownfields may very well have since
vanished. CERCLA, essentially a liability statute, only works to
clean up brownfields when a responsible party can be found.
Without a responsible party, we are then left with the tools of
CERCLA, which by themselves cannot adequately fix our
brownfields problem.
IV. IN RE 6,000 PARCELS V. PEOPLE OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK
As a theoretical means of demonstrating the process by which we
as citizens may be liable for contribution to the cleanup of
brownfields, I propose to further explore the case, which I named,
6,000 Parcels v. People of the City of New York. As to precisely
how the lawsuit would start, imagine that several citizens have
formed a corporation that will adopt an orphaned parcel of land and
represent its interests in a lawsuit against the citizens of the City of
New York. In this way, an 'innocent,' legal 'person' is created. The
process of the parcel's adoption could be roughly based on
adoption law already in place in New York State where a party may
petition the court to adopt a child and thereby terminate the legal
and parental obligations of the biological parents.91 More
corporations could be formed to adopt other orphaned parcels and
then all of the parcels could join together to form a class action
lawsuit. The remedy would be in the form of funds for cleanup of
the contaminated parcels.
Several issues would then arise over whether this case could be
heard by a court. First, does 6,000 Parcels have standing to sue and
does it have justiciable privileges? Second, would a federal court
have jurisdiction over this case? Finally, can the citizens of New
York City be reached to attach liability for brownfields
contamination?
The corporations that assemble in 6,000 Parcels may form an
association instead of suing independently. Such associations have
90. See PERCIVAL, supra note 63, at 134 (arguing that consumer
choices affect market forces which in turn, can effectively influence
industry environmental practices).
91. See, e.g., N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 110 (McKinney 1999).
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been found to have blanket standing if the association satisfies
certain elements:
An association has standing to sue on behalf of its
members when three requisites have been fulfilled: (1) at
least one of the members possesses standing to sue in his
or her own right; (2) the interests that the suit seeks to
vindicate are pertinent to the objectives for which the
organization was formed; and (3) neither the claim
asserted nor the relief demanded necessitates the personal
participation of affected individuals. These prerequisites
for associational standing ensure that Article III's case or
controversy requirement is satisfied in a given situation.
92
6,000 Parcels may immediately satisfy two of these three elements
of standing for associations. The association was formed primarily
with the goal of these plaintiff parcels being put to productive use
once again. Since the plaintiff parcels are all contaminated, the
relief sought in the form of a cleanup, is similar. As for personal
participation of the parcel, this is a nullity except for its citizen
representatives. But this does not necessarily negate standing for
the association. The final issue, whether one of the members has
standing to sue in his or her own right, warrants further analysis.
Case law has established the elements of standing:
First, the plaintiff must have suffered an 'injury in fact' -
an invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a)
concrete and particularized ... and (b) 'actual or
imminent', not 'conjectural' or 'hypothetical.' Second,
there must be a causal connection between the injury and
the conduct complained of-the injury has to be 'fairly...
trace[able] to the challenged action of the defendant, and
not ... th[e] result [of] the independent action of some
third party not before the court.' Third, it must be 'likely,'
as opposed to merely 'speculative,' that the injury will be
'redressed by a favorable decision.' 93
I will address each of these elements in turn.
In exploring whether 6,000 Parcels has a legally protected
interest, references and analogies to a wide variety of sources are in
92. United States v. AVX Corp., 962 F.2d 108, 116 (1st Cir.
1992) (citations omitted).
93. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992)
(citations omitted).
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order. Scholars have struggled for years with the concept of how a
body that is essentially disassociated from a human being may still
be recognized by law. I argue that for functional reasons in limited
circumstances, and based on public policy considerations,
brownfields should be awarded legal standing.
Current environmental laws may already accord 6,000 Parcels
legal 'privileges,' by inference.9 4 CERCLA regulates the release of
hazardous substances and imposes liability on a variety of
Potentially Responsible Parties ("PRP's") for certain releases.95 In
other words, a parcel has a privilege to be cleaned up from the
release of hazardous substances and the responsible party must pay
to make the parcel whole again. Similar, albeit limited, privileges
for environmental objects may be implied in the Clean Water Act.96
Bodies of water have a limited privilege to reject any quantities
over a statutorily established amount of pollutants from a point
source.97 This is also true of the Clean Air Act where a locale has a
limited privilege to take action when various pollutants exceed the
established limits. 98
In addition, a limited privilege has been granted to certain
buildings to refuse alteration or demolition. For example, New
York City's Landmark Preservation Law99 declares it is "unlawful
for any person in charge ... to alter, reconstruct or demolish any
improvement constituting a part of [the landmark] . . . or to
construct any improvement upon land embraced within such site..
• unless the [landmarks preservation] commission has previously
issued [the appropriate certificate] . . . ." 0 The owner or person in
charge "shall keep [it] in good repair"'"' and this requirement of
good repair is "in addition to all other provisions of law requiring
[the structure] to be kept in good repair." ' 2 Buildings or sites
designated as landmarks enjoy a limited privilege to be free from
94. I use the term "privileges" instead of "rights" to imply that
these are not absolute (as are constitutional "rights"), but arise solely to
assist in the clean up of brownfields.
95. 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (1994).
96. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1994).
97. Id. § 1313.
98. 42 U.S.C. § 7661 (1994).
99. See N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 25, § 301-321 (1992).
100. Id. § 305(a)(1).
101. Id.§311(a).
102. Id. § 311(d).
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alteration or demolition (excluding those approved by the
commission) and as to repairs also have a greater privilege than
other buildings or sites without landmark status. This privilege is
usually vested on a site-by-site basis, and violations of the law may
call for restoration of the landmark"°3 along with penalties and
possible imprisonment.)"
Corporations, also non-human entities, can sue and be sued, buy
and sell property, and, of course, pay taxes. "05 Hence a corporation
may have standing.0 6 Similar to corporations, ships are another
example of a non-human object that can be sued independently of
its owners.
A ship is the most living of inanimate things. Servants
sometimes say 'she' of a clock, but every one gives a
gender to vessels .... It is only by supposing the ship to
have been treated as if endowed with personality, that the
arbitrary seeming peculiarities of the maritime law can be
made intelligible, and on that supposition they at once
become consistent and logical.
10 7
In fact, with lawsuits involving ships, the name of the ship is often
listed as the defendant. 08 Holmes explains that "[t]he owner [of the
vessel] . . . is not to blame [for any damage that the vessel may
have caused], and he cannot even be charged on the ground that the
damage was done by his servants. He is free from personal liability
on elementary principle."'0 9  Countries, states, and associations
103. See id. § 25-317(e).
104. See id. § 317(b).
105. See HARRY G. HENN & JOHN R. ALEXANDER, LAWS OF
CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS ENTERPRISES 125 (3d ed., 1983)
(explaining that "[b]y definition, then, a corporation, is an entity, and is
so regarded for most legal purposes.").
106. See, e.g., N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 626(a) (McKinney
1999).
107. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 25 (Mark
DeWolfe Howe ed., 1963).
108. See, e.g., Md. Nat'l Bank v. Vessel Madam Chapel, 46
F.3d 895 (9th Cir. 1995); Mobile Marine Sales, Ltd. v. MN Prodromos,
776 F.2d 85 (3d Cir. 1985); S.C. State Ports Auth. v. MN Tyson Lykes,
867 F. Supp. 1357 (D.S.C. 1993); Rainbow Line, Inc. v. MN Tequila,
341 F. Supp. 459 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
109. Holmes, supra note 107, at 25 ("Yet it is perfectly settled
that there is a lien on his vessel for the amount of the damage done, and
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share many of these same qualities as ships and corporations. Thus,
many entities, human and non-human, may have the standing
necessary to sue or be sued, depending on the circumstances.
To extend standing to brownfields, however, would mean
extending standing to a completely unrecognized legal entity. In
surveying the current standing jurisprudence in terms of
environmental cases, it becomes evident that standing might be
interpreted broadly should public policy dictate. For example, in
Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Serv., Inc., both the
dissent and majority agreed that "demonstration of harm to the
environment is not enough to satisfy the injury-in-fact requirement
unless the plaintiff can demonstrate how he personally was
harmed."" However, the majority nevertheless held that standing
existed because the alleged environmental contamination "directly
affected ... [the plaintiffs] recreational, aesthetic, and economic
interests."'' As demonstrated by Laidlaw, if the courts are
protective of a single person's recreational activities, perhaps they
might extend this same logic to include 6,000 Parcels' interests in
being contamination free, which is a direct result of public policy
concerns.
To satisfy the injury in fact element of standing, 6,000 Parcels
could present documentation of a typical parcel's contaminants
while proving that this contamination does not exist naturally, and
that it was produced as a by-product of the manufacturing process.
A history of the parcel, along with records of exactly what
chemical compounds were used or stored on the site, would help
prove injury to the site. In addition, 6,000 Parcels could show that
this hazardous contamination does not exist on parcels outside the
association. This would show that the injury is specific to the
this means that that vessel may be arrested and sold to pay the loss in any
admiralty court whose process will reach her." (footnote omitted)).
110. 120 S.Ct. 693, 714 (2000) (Scalia, J. dissenting) (emphasis
in original).
111. Id. at 705 ("We have held that environmental plaintiffs
adequately allege injury in fact when they aver that they use the affected
area and are persons 'for whom the aesthetic and recreational values of
the area will be lessened' by the challenged activity."); see also Lujan v.
Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 562-63 (1992) ("Of course, the
desire to use or observe an animal species, even for purely esthetic
purposes, is undeniably a cognizable interest for purpose of standing."
(citation omitted)).
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parcels involved in the lawsuit. This preliminary information may
be enough to prove to a court that a concrete injury exists.
To satisfy the actual and imminent prong of the injury in fact
element of standing, 6,000 Parcels might show that, due to the
migratory nature of the hazardous wastes on the parcel, the injury
is continuing and quite possibly will continue into the foreseeable
future. This is because "[t]he environmental harms do not stem
from the act of dumping when waste materials slide off the dump
truck but rather after they land and begin to seep into the ground,
contaminating soil and water.""' 2 Thus, it is the waste seeping into
the soil that causes actual harm. The contaminants could continue
to seep into the soil in the future, causing imminent harm."3
To satisfy the redressability prong of standing, 6,000 Parcels
must demonstrate to the court that it is likely its injury will be
corrected by a favorable decision."4 First, specific injury
determination is essential for each parcel, and then a proposed
remedy must be assigned. This can be achieved by designing a
system where each parcel would be personalized to allow specific
consideration of each parcel's injuries.
The corporation that owns 6,000 Parcels could personalize the
parcels by providing each parcel with a name or number. For
inanimate objects such as ships or vessels, the necessity of a name
is actually a statutory requirement of their Vessel Identification
System." 5 A corporation must be identified with a name as well." 6
While the New York City Department of buildings and title
companies uses addresses to name a site, such a method may not be
sufficient for naming parcels." 7 Using a parcel's lot and block
number may be a more appropriate form of identification than an
address. To further delineate the parcel as a special entity, use of
the designation "Brownfield Parcel" may be used while cleanup is
in progress. Ultimately, the "Brownfield Parcel" prefix would be
discarded when the parcel's cleanup is successfully completed.
112. Gache v. Harrison, New York, 813 F. Supp. 1037, 1041
(S.D.N.Y. 1993).
113. See id. at 1043.
114. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561.
115. See 46 U.S.C. § 12502(a)(3), (d) (1994).
116. See, e.g., N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 402(a)(1) (McKinney
1999).
117. See N.Y. ADMIN. CODE § 26-129 (1999).
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Proof of redressability would include involvement by the same
community groups that were created to adopt the orphaned
brownfield sites. This participation serves two distinct functions.
First, the community group could serve as a repository of
information about the specific parcel's hazardous contents, monitor
how the cleanup is going, and provide timely reports to the court.' 8
Second, the community group would serve as an advocate to
parties interested in developing the parcel once it has been cleaned.
This proposed system should satisfy the redressability prong by
enabling community groups to demonstrate that holding the
citizens of New York City liable will remedy the injury done to
brownfields, since these same citizens may be linked to liability for
its contamination.
The final element of standing is the causal connection between
the injury and the alleged wrong. The causal connection issue
simultaneously addresses whether 6,000 Parcels can reach the
People of the City of New York in order to assign liability. To
establish a causal connection between the contamination of 6,000
Parcels and the citizens of the City of New York, foundational
analogies may be culled from the law of negligence. One case that
considers how far liability for an act might be traced back to the
original source is the famous Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co."9
The basic issue in Palsgraf was whether the plaintiff could sue the
railroad without suing the other parties involved. Agency law
protected the railroad employee from suit;' the man with the
package vanished, the stampede of people could not be located, and
the scales could not be held liable, as they were inanimate objects.
118. As an analogy, consider the citizen suit provisions of the
Clean Water Act where citizens are allowed, in limited circumstances, to
initiate a suit on their own behalf for injunctive relief against polluters.
33 U.S.C. § 1365 (1994). See also The Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7604
(1994); The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6972
(1994); The Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2619 (1994).
119. 248 N.Y. 339 (Ct. App. 1928).
120. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 8A (1958).
It is inevitable that in doing their work, either through
negligence or excess zeal, agents will harm third persons or
will deal with them in unauthorized ways. It would be unfair
for an enterprise to have the benefit of the work of its agents
without making it responsible to some extent for their
excesses and failures to act carefully.
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Thus, the only party left to seek recovery from was the railroad.
While the majority according to Judge Cardozo refused to stretch
liability this far, Judge Andrews' dissent addresses the justification
for limiting liability:
What we do mean by the word 'proximate' is, that because
of convenience, of public policy, of a rough sense of
justice, the law arbitrarily declines to trace a series of
events beyond a certain point. This is not logic. It is
practical politics . . . .We may regret that the line was
drawn just where it was, but drawn somewhere it had to be
.... The words we used were simply indicative of our
notions of public policy.121
Hence, limits on liability may merely be a matter of circumstances,
a judicial sense of fairness, or more importantly, public policy.
Public policy is an important basis for extending liability to
include the citizens of New York City. While public policy has
never been succinctly defined in United States Supreme Court
decisions ,12' eminent jurists have attempted to define the term in
other writings.
The very considerations which judges most rarely
mention, and always with an apology are the secret root
from which the law draws all the juices of life. I mean, of
course, considerations of what is expedient for the
community concerned. Every important principle which is
developed by litigation is in fact and at bottom the result
of more or less definitely understood views of public
policy; most generally, to be sure, under our practice and
traditions, the unconscious result of instinctive preferences
121. Palsgraf, 248 N.Y. at 352-53.
122. See Richard H. W. Maloy, Public Policy-Who Should
Make It In America's Oligarchy?, 1998 DET. C.L. MICH. ST. U. L. REV.
1143, 1145-46 (1998).
The Supreme Court has not rendered a precise definition of
public policy. In fact, Justice Brown said it was 'impossible
to define with accuracy.' Other Justices have described it in
similar terms: 'vague,' 'variable,' 'a very uncertain thing.' In
particular, Justice Gray said that 'no fixed rule can be given
by which to determine what is public policy.
Id. (footnotes omitted); Alan B. Handler, Judging Public Policy, 31
RUTGERS L.J. 301, 303 (2000) ("A precise definition of public policy is
elusive. It is rooted in the definition of law itself. Public policy may be
defined broadly to include both utilitarian and moral considerations.").
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and inarticulate convictions, but. none the less traceable to
views of public policy in the last analysis. 1
23
Should a court be allowed to set public policy without exceeding its
jurisdiction in relation to the Separation of Powers doctrine?" 4
While the judiciary may not per se proclaim public policy, where
an interpretation of public policy is necessary, the court may do so
as long as it proceeds with extreme caution.'25 "The courts may
make public policy, but only when the people through their
constitutions and statutes have not done so .... [T]his limitation
on the courts' power to make public policy does not prevent them
from making some very important public policies, in the absence of
conflicting legislation."'' 26 Since "[p]ublic policy is to be
ascertained by reference to the laws and legal precedents and not
from general considerations of supposed public interests,"'127 6,000
Parcels should argue that public policy considerations mandate
both the cleanup of hazardous wastes and the productive utilization
of orphaned sites.
In addition to public policy, there are portions of certain
environmental statutes and case holdings that provide conceptual
justifications for extending liability to citizens. The Resource
Conservation Recovery Act ("RCRA") states that liability for
hazardous waste may attach to any party "who has contributed or
who is contributing to" the disposal of hazardous waste. 28
CERCLA also attaches liability for cleanup costs to parties who
have "otherwise arranged" for the disposal of hazardous
123. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW (4th
ed., 1923).
124. See Handler, supra note 122, at 302.
At the core of [concerns regarding judicial 'activism'] is the
perception that public policy, which is the central concern of
other agencies of government and society, has .unduly
intruded into judicial decisions. The intriguing question this
tense debate raises is whether public policy appropriately
figures in judicial decisions and, in exploring that question,
whether it is possible to identify, define, and explain public
policy and to draw a line between inappropriate and essentialjudicial incorporation of public policy in judicial decision
making.
Id.
125. See Maloy, supra note 122, at 1159 (footnote omitted).
126. Id. (citations omitted).
127. Id. at 1162 (citation omitted).
128. 42 U.S.C. § 6973(a) (1994).
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substances.19 Nowhere do the above statutes define the words
"contributed" or "otherwise arranged." These words may be
defined using their common usage since "[t]he literal meaning is
that which the words express, taking them in their natural and
ordinary sense; that is, giving to words of common use their
commonly accepted meaning. '"3 By defining these terms in this
manner, it is possible to interpret them as holding citizens liable for
their role in the contamination of brownfields.
In holding citizens liable for cleanups, it must be determined
whether industry contaminated the site at society's behest.
Consumers are the intended beneficiaries of products. Toxic by-
products are inherent in the manufacturing process of these
products. 3 Consumers know that through the manufacturing
process industry is contaminating the environment.' This
effectively means that consumers are contaminating the
environment themselves by purchasing products. 33 Industry is
extraordinarily sensitive to consumers' wishes. As a result,
consumers have the ability to send a clear message to industry that
they will not accept contamination of the environment, by refusing
to purchase these products. In turn, it is likely that industry would
respond immediately.'34 Consumers have some degree of control
129. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(3) (1994).
130. FRANCIS J. MCCAFFREY, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION: A
STATEMENT AND EXPOSITION OF THE GENERAL RULES OF STATUTORY
CONSTRUCTION 3 (1953).
131. See, e.g., United States v. Aceto Agr. Chems. Corp., 872
F.2d 1373 (8th Cir. 1989) (discussing contamination as an inherent part
of the pesticide manufacturing process).
132. But see Michael B. Gerrard, Demons and Angels in
Hazardous Waste Regulation: Are Justice, Efficiency, and Democracy
Reconcilable?, 92 N.W. U. L. REV. 706, 713 (1998) (book review)
("Products are not labeled to disclose the hazardous waste generated in
their manufacture, so consumers (except when buying such obvious items
as paint thinner) have no idea of the effects of their purchases. They also
have no control at all over the mode of manufacture.").
133. See, e.g., PERCIVAL, supra note 63, at 208 (citing H.R.
REP. 94-1491, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., at 10-11 (1976) ("The House
committee report accompanying [the 1976 RCRA] legislation noted that
each year Americans discarded 71 billion cans, 38 billion jars and bottles,
35 million tons of paper, 7.6 million televisions, 7 million cars and
trucks, and 4 million tons of plastics.")).
134. See, e.g., PERCIVAL, supra note 63, at 134.
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over industry's decision to dispose of toxic waste the cheapest way.
With control comes responsibility, and with responsibility comes
the obligation to change one's lifestyle for the common good.
A case that establishes some guideposts for attaching liability to
consumers is United States v. Aceto Agric. Chems. Corp. ("Aceto
F).135 In Aceto II, the issue was whether a manufacturer of a
hazardous substance was liable for contamination caused at a
subcontractor's site when the owner sent the substance to the
subcontractor for mixing and formulation.'36 The court began its
analysis by stating, "CERCLA places the ultimate responsibility for
clean up on 'those responsible for problems caused by the disposal
of chemical poisons."'137 In response to the defendant's argument
that they did not control the handling and disposal of the hazardous
waste, the court countered that not imposing liability "would allow
defendants to simply 'close their eyes' to the method of disposal of
their hazardous substances, a result contrary to the policies
underlying CERCLA." '138
The Aceto II case links liability through an independent
subcontractor to the manufacturers of toxic chemicals by using four
interesting rationales. First, Aidex, the formulator subcontractor,
was declared bankrupt in 1981.139 Since funds available for
cleanups are limited, and since cleanup costs for each site may be
When consumers are well-informed and free to choose,
market forces can generate remarkably effective pressure to
stop practices that cause environmental damage. For example,
although the Marine Mammal Protection Act limits the
number of dolphins that tuna fishers can kill each year,
environmentalists . . . launched a boycott of tuna that
succeeded when a major seafood processor announced that it
would no longer purchase tuna that had been captured using
fishing practices that result in harm to dolphins . . . .The
enormous influence of consumer preferences was
demonstrated when, within hours of the announcement, the
company's two leading competitors announced similar
policies of purchasing only tuna caught using dolphin-safe
methods.
Id. (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
135. 872 F.2d 1373 (8th Cir. 1989).
136. See id. at 1375.
137. Id. at 1377 (citation omitted).
138. Id.
139. Id. at 1375.
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tremendously expensive, 4 ' it is essential to find an entity that has
sufficient funds to contribute to cleanups.
Second, the court links control of the site and the product using
language such as "contributed to" and "arranged for." Stating that
"Congress used broad language in providing for liability for
persons who . . . 'arranged for' the disposal of hazardous
substances . . . courts have concluded that a liberal judicial
interpretation is consistent with CERCLA's 'overwhelmingly
remedial' statutory scheme."'' The court further noted that "courts
have not hesitated to look beyond defendants' characterizations to
determine whether a transaction in fact involves an arrangement for
the disposal of a hazardous substance."' 42 The court advocated
imposing liability "on those who had the authority to control the
disposal, even without ownership or possession."'43 Liability
follows control; here control is not restricted to actual control, but
the potential ability to control.
Third, the court uses a principle of common law, vicarious
liability for abnormally hazardous operations, to further link the
manufacturer to the acts of its subcontractor. "[Vicarious liability]
means that, by reason of some relation existing between A and B,
the negligence of A is to be charged against B, although B has
played no part in it, has done nothing whatever to aid or encourage
it, or indeed has done all that he possibly can to prevent it."' 44
Finally, the court links ownership of the resultant hazardous
waste back to Aceto. "[Aceto] contracted with Aidex to formulate
their technical grade pesticides; they retained ownership of the
pesticide throughout the process; and inherent in the process is the
140. See, e.g., David J. Benson, Comment, CERCLA Vicarious
Liability After United States v. Aceto Chemical Corporation: More Than
a Common-Law Duty?, 76 IOWA L. REv. 641, 646 (1991) ("As of
November 30, 1986, the EPA had spent $10,013,700.00 on these
response actions. As of March 1, 1987, the State of Iowa had incurred
expenses of $95,451.00 and was committed to the EPA to pay an
additional $780,000.00." (citations omitted)).
141. Aceto II, 872 F.2d at 1380 (citations omitted).
142. Id. at 1381.
143. Id. at 1382 (citing N.E. Pharm. & Chem. Co., Inc., 810
F.2d 726 (8th Cir. 1985)).
144. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE
LAW OF TORTS 499 (5th ed., 1984).
903
904 FORDHAMENVIRONMENTAL LAWJOURNAL
generation of wastes.' ' 45 Therefore Aceto is responsible for the
cleanup. 1
46
In light of the above analysis, 6,000 Parcels should argue that
liability attaches to the citizens of New York City for several
reasons. First, since funds are currently unavailable for cleanup,
public policy 147 directs that liability be shifted to the next available
party in this specific situation. Second, the hazardous waste
contaminating 6,000 Parcels was an inherent by-product of items
that were produced for the benefit of citizens and at their behest,
and since responsibility follows control, public policy holds that it
is proper in this instance to expand the definition of control to
include these specific circumstances. Third, since the original
wrongdoers are unavailable, liberal judicial interpretation is
necessary to further the clear intents of both CERCLA and RCRA
in the brownfields situation. Ownership of the hazardous wastes
should be linked to the goods produced. Since consumers now own
these items, liability should extend to consumers who now also
own the hazardous wastes inherent in their production.
Assuming that 6,00 Parcels is found to have standing, the final
issue would be whether a federal court would have the jurisdiction
145. Aceto II, 872 F.2d at 1383.
146. See Benson, supra note 140, at n.54 (citing United States
v. Aceto Agr. Chems. Corp. 699 F. Supp. 1384 (S.D. Iowa 1988) ("Aceto
"). The Aceto I court
never explicitly said that liability was imposed because the
defendants still owned the hazardous substance. This can be
implied, however, because of the court's statement that 'the
reasoning necessary to extend § 107(a)(3) liability to cover
these defendants cannot necessarily be limited to defendants
who owned the pesticides throughout the process.'
Id.
147. See Acme Fill Corp. v. Althin CD Medical, Inc., 1995 WL
597300, at *11 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (stating "it is worth noting that the
essential public policy and Congressional intent underlying CERCLA 'is
to place the ultimate responsibility for cleaning up hazardous waste on
those responsible for problems caused by the disposal of chemical
poison."' (citation omitted)); Castlerock Estates, Inc. v. Estate of
Markham, 871 F. Supp. 360, 366 (N.D. Cal. 1994) ("[P]ublic policy
mandates that CERCLA be applied broadly in order to effect its remedial
provisions.").
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to hear this case.'48 The Constitution provides for which cases may
be heard by a federal court:
The judicial power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and
Equity arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the
United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made,
under their authority; --to all Cases affecting
Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls; --to all
cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction; --to
Controversies to which the United States shall be a Party; -
-to Controversies between two or more States; --between a
State and Citizens of another State; --between Citizens of
different States; --between Citizens of the same State
claiming Lands under Grants of different States, and
between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign
States, Citizens or Subjects. 149
6,000 Parcels may be heard in federal court based on federal
question jurisdiction. "The federal district courts shall have original
jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws,
or treaties of the United States."'50 I argue that the brownfield issue
may be traced to federal law (CERCLA), therefore a federal court
would have jurisdiction.
V. BROWNFIELDS IN THE SCHEME OF THINGS
The generation growing up in the 1950's and 1960's was witness
to countless governmental endeavors, some great, some mediocre,
and some bordering on lunacy. Somehow the notion was formed
that throwing money at a problem would solve it. As an example of
this, consider the massive federally funded high-rise urban renewal
projects of the 1950's and 1960's that, while intending to
148. See United States v. Nicolet, Inc., 712 F. Supp. 1193, 1201
(E.D. Pa. 1989) (stating where "overriding federal interests exist, courts
should fashion uniform federal rules of decision" (citations omitted)).
The better forum for establishing uniform rules for application
nationwide is the federal system. As a result, I have chosen to explore
this mythical lawsuit in the context of the federal court system.
149. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2; cl. 1; see also Lujan v. Defenders
of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 559-60 (1992) (stating that this is important
because "the Constitution's central mechanism of separation of powers
depends largely upon common understanding of what activities are
appropriate to legislatures, to executives, and to courts.").
150. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1994).
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rejuvenate communities, resulted in destroying them further. 5'
These projects were designed under the naive assumption that
constructing something new would magically revitalize a
neighborhood, thus transforming the impoverished residents of the
area into productive members of our society. As a society, we
learned the hard way that this was definitely not the way to
successfully solve a problem. We should now realize from this
urban renewal debacle that we cannot solve a problem simply by
throwing money at it.'52 What is required is the intelligent and
sensitive understanding of the problem in relation to the larger
system. In the brownfields arena, the question is how the
brownfields problem may fit into the urban fabric as a whole.
151. See generally OSCAR NEWMAN, DEFENSIBLE SPACE:
CRIME PREVENTION THROUGH URBAN DESIGN (1972) (analyzing why
these high-rise housing projects failed); see also DEP'T OF Hous. AND
URBAN DEV., 2020 MANAGEMENT REFORM PLAN, available at
http://www.hud.gov:80/reform/mrindex.html#contents (last visited Aug.
6, 2000).
Architect Frank Lloyd Wright once said that a doctor can bury
his mistakes, but an architect can only advise his clients to
plant vines. It's the same at HUD, our failures were
Fsectacular, three-dimensional and out there like an eyesore
or all the world to see. And since our job was to help the
poor, and there were still poor, then we must have failed.
Id.
152. See JANE JACOBS, THE DEATH AND LIFE OF GREAT
AMERICAN CITIES 4 (1961).
There is a wistful myth that if only we had enough money to
spend-the figure is usually put at a hundred billion dollars-
we could wipe out all our slums in ten years, reverse decay in
the great, dull, gray belts that were yesterday's and day-
before-yesterday s suburbs, anchor the wandering middle
class and its wandering tax money, and perhaps even solve the
traffic problem. But [ook what we have built with the first
several billions: Low-income projects that become worse
centers of delinquency, vandalism and general social
hopelessness than the slums they were supposed to replace.
Middle-income housing projects which are truly marvels of
dullness and regimentation, sealed against any buoyancy or
vitality of city life. Luxury housing projects that mitigate
their inanity, or try to, with a vapid vulgarity. Cultural centers
that are unable to support a good bookstore. Civic centers that
are avoided by everyone but bums, who have fewer choices of
loitering place than others. Commercial centers that are lack-
luster imitations of standardized suburban chain-store
shopping. Promenades that go from no place to nowhere and
have no promenaders. Expressways that eviscerate great
cities. This is not the rebuilding of cities. This is the sacking
of cities.
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Solely focusing on brownfields would be decidedly myopic
without the reestablishment of a practical connection between
brownfields and the rest of the urban fabric. Three questions must
be answered: (1) what are the immediate versus long-term goals,
(2) what standards should be used for cleanup, and finally (3) how
should these ideas be applied.
I propose that the entire process must begin with brownfields
cleanup first, and this is why I have focused much of the earlier
part of this writing on the 6, 000 Parcels lawsuit. The 6, 000 Parcels
case has the potential to raise the capital necessary to clean these
sites, to residential levels. Sites cleaned to residential levels will
result in optimizing development alternatives for future
generations, thus comporting with our duties of stewardship,
trusteeship, and tenancy.
It will take time to begin to craft a sensitive and intelligent
approach to the brownfields problem in general, as well as
brownfields in urban areas, specifically. A new sensitivity and
environmental awareness on the part of urban planners and
designers has developed, and hopefully, this process will continue
and expand.153
Many factors, other than contamination however, lead to the non-
use of land. 54 Several non-environmental factors that typically
affect the market value of a site, as well as the feasibility of reuse
of the property include: site location;155 site accessibility;'56 site
size; site configuration;'57 existing buildings; infrastructure; 58
Id.
153. See, e.g., Cathy Lang Ho, Waste Not, Want Not,
ARCHITECTURE 80 (Nov. 2000) (exploring the transformation of Ford
Motor Company's 1200-acre plant into an environmentally friendly
zone).
154. See Robertson, supra note 20, at 1084 (arguing that while
liability for environmental contamination under CERCLA is an important
barrier to the reuse of Brownfields sites, it is but one piece of the
complex puzzle explaining why reuse is stymied).
155. See id. at 1093.
156. See id.
157. Michael E. Porter, The Competitive Advantage of the Inner
City, HARV. Bus. REv. May-June 1995, at 55, 62.
158. See Robertson supra note 20, at 1092 (noting "factors that
will make a site attractive include access to interstate highways and an
airport, high population densities, and an ability to generate consumer
traffic.").
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zoning and likelihood of rezoning;'59 state and local tax burden on
the site property or applicable to site activities; labor for
construction or business operations at the site; utility rates; liability
insurance;16° the degree of public safety; access to markets; site
preparation costs; agglomeration of economies; local land use and
environmental regulation; cost of land and labor; 6' and community
obstruction.16
The tremendous energies devoted to the problem of brownfields
revitalization are not sufficient in that they fail to address the
elements that are equally crucial to successful revitalization. Since
these other factors will take some time to even begin implementing,
it seems logical to instead concentrate our energies on first cleaning
up brownfield sites, while concurrently considering a system to
enable the marketing of these sites. Cleanup is essential to protect
both our physical health and the redevelopment that will protect
our economic health.
The de-industrialization of our urban cores has continued for
some time. This means that if successful, the "adaptive re-use" of a
brownfield site will tend not to be for industrial use, but for other
uses, such as housing, schools, and concomitant retail use.'63
159. See id.
160. Susan Neuman and Jerry Cavaluzzi, Environmental
Insurance for Brownfields Redevelopment (Part 1), 19 THE N.Y. ENVTL.
LAW. 22 (Spring 1999) ("Environmental insurance can be a useful tool in
the process of brownfields redevelopment, but it is underutilized ....
Although insurance companies are now marketing these products
aggressively, especially to environmental lawyers .. .prior experiences
have created a general reluctance to rely on insurance for environmental
liability risk.").
161. See Robertson supra note 20, at 1092 (footnotes omitted).
162. See id. at 1090.
Communities are often concerned about contaminated lands in
their neighborhoods and the lack of public involvement in the
cleanup process. Economic developers and environmentally
concerned communities and individuals have been at odds for
years with respect to redevelopment issues. One reason is that
the public is dubious about government's and business'
ability to remove contamination safely.
Id.
163. See, e.g., HARVARD UNIVERSITY JOINT CENTER FOR
HOUSING STUDIES, THE STATE OF THE NATION'S HOUSING: 2000, at 1-2
(last visited Aug. 30, 2000), at http://www.gsd.harvard.edu/jcenter
[hereinafter "Housing Studies"] ("As employment continues to
decentralize, households are able to live and work at greater and greater
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Residential uses require much higher levels of site cleanup than do
industrial because of the presence of sensitive individuals such as
children for much longer time periods. Accordingly, cleanup
standards for brownfields should conform to residential guidelines.
As stated above, this would provide maximum flexibility for reuse
of contaminated parcels and also comport with society's duty as a
bailee. There should be two limited exceptions to this rule: (1)
existing small businesses, as discussed below, and (2) situations
where removal of the contamination would be significantly more
environmentally hazardous than encapsulation."6 Economic factors
should also be irrelevant. The argument should not be clouded by
considerations of whether it is sensible to spend dollars to save
lives. 65 Rather, it should be argued that the need to cleanup
Brownfield sites is based on our duty to protect future generations.
We have a responsibility to future generations, and a liability for
our mistakes as a society. I will continue to stress these ideas as I
discuss Brownfields in four categories: Brownfields that Aren't,
Brownfields that Will, Brownfields that Might, and Brownfields
that Won't.
A. Brownfields that Aren't
The first category refers to existing sites where functioning,
small-scale industries are located and have contamination within.
While these sites are not brownfields per se, they may very well be
orphaned in the future. For example, local automotive repair shops
may be contributing to contamination of sites and surrounding
distances from the urban core. As a result, low-density metro counties
have witnessed explosive job and housing growth in recent years while
activity in high-density counties has been limited.").
164. See HEALTH EFFECTS INSTITUTE-ASBESTOS RESEARCH,
ASBESTOS IN PUBLIC AND COMMERCIAL BUILDINGS: A LITERATURE
REVIEW AND SYNTHESIS OF CURRENT KNOWLEDGE, 1-10 to 1-11 (1991)
(Table 1) (cited in STEVEN BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE:
TOWARD EFFECTIVE RISK REGULATION 12,13 (1993) (footnotes
omitted)); B.T. Mossman et al., Asbestos: Scientific Developments and
Implications for Public Policy, 247 SCI. 294, 299 (1990) (arguing that,
while regulations are essentially beneficial, there are certain areas where
they are counterproductive).
165. But see, United States v. Ottatti & Goss, 900 F.2d 429 (1st
Cir. 1990) (balancing the potential risk of harm to children resulting from
contaminated soil, against the economic cost of cleanup).
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neighbors because of lead and solvents in its paints, or improper
disposal of the contaminants used in automobiles, such as oil,
transmission fluid, and coolant. Moreover, local dry cleaners that
have reduced perc166 from their processes may still be faced with
contamination in their establishments. While not orphaned,
businesses occupying these sites may be financially unable to
afford the necessary cleanups. Should the strict and unforgiving
liability of CERCLA that we have used in the past also be used to
decimate these businesses, or is there another solution?
These small-scale businesses are quite important in terms of
improving the quality (such as it is) of urban life. On the other
hand, the responsibility for maintaining a safe environment lies
with all of us. In light of these two contradictory issues, I propose
that such sites be classified as brownfields and that they be allowed
to obtain funds for cleanup from the damage awards collected in
cases such as 6,000 Parcels. In exchange for having the site
cleaned up, the business would be contractually bound to the
adopting community group to eliminate and replace certain
practices with environmentally safe methods designated by the
community group. This may entail the purchase of new equipment,
which would be financed with the help of the community group.
The community group might then be able to direct more patrons to
the business to provide financial rewards for participation in such a
cleanup effort.
B. Brownfields that Will
This category includes the small number of sites that are ideally
situated, and where the contamination is minor, and the potential
for profit is high. Redevelopment of these sites is almost certain.
166. See NEIGHBORHOOD CLEANERS ASSOCIATION
INTERNATIONAL, DRYCLEANING OWNER/MANAGER AND OPERATOR
TRAINING AND CERTIFICATION MANUAL 14 (June 1999) [hereinafter
"TRAINING AND CERTIFICATION MANUAL"] (copy kindly provided to
author by Community French Cleaners, 114 Lexington Avenue, New
York, N.Y.). "Perc" or perchloroethylene is "the solvent of choice for
about 80% of the drycleaners nationwide."; E-mail from Wayne Tusa,
President, Environmental Risk & Loss Control, Inc., to author (Aug. 29,
2000) (on file with author) (stating perc is "'pollutant of the year' and
political considerations may have a more significant impact on the
selection of a remedy").
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This situation may be a result of outside factors, such as the re-
routing of a transportation artery, creation of a specific
empowerment zone, re-zoning, or any number of changes in the
political climate. Community groups must be aware of any changes
in the environment that will cause a brownfield site to become
commercially viable so as to incorporate all, or an economically
reasonable portion of, cleanup funds already spent into the site's
purchase price. This portion of the funds could be returned to the
neighborhood in the form of community redevelopment projects.
C. Brownfields that Might
This class of brownfields includes those sites that contain
moderate amounts of contamination, but due to economic burdens,
are avoided because developers prefer to seek out greenfield sites.
These are sites where tax credits, covenants not to sue, 67 comfort
letters,'68 and creative leasing/purchasing options 69 may tip the
scales in favor of development. In order to effectively advocate for
a specific site, community groups must be aware of the site's
potential development viability and of its contamination.
Community groups would advocate changes in city infrastructure
167. See MARK S. DENNISON, BROWNFIELDS
REDEVELOPMENT: PROGRAMS AND STRATEGIES FOR REHABILITATING
CONTAMINATED REAL ESTATE 161 (1998).
This covenant prevents the state from taking any civil or
administrative action against the brownfields developer/owner
for any liability regarding existing contamination. covenants
not to sue, or other written assurances, must be recorded into
the chain of title and run with the land to put owners and
purchasers on notice of the status of brownfields sites. This
could create some measure of certainty in transactions
involving brownfields sites.
Id.
168. Id. ("These letters appear to be a promising and flexible
tool. The EPA can send a letter stating the status of the site under
consideration. While not as effective as a covenant not to sue, these
letters can at least provide some level of assurance to potential
investors."). Id.
169. Id. ("Another tactic recommended by the EPA is to forego
an immediate purchase in favor of entering into a lease with an option to
purchase. The prospective purchaser would remain a tenant while the site
is being cleaned up . . . and then exercise the option to purchase only
after the cleanup is completed."). Id.
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and zoning which would be beneficial to the re-development of the
site.
Although the community group's watch over cleanups would be
on a day-to-day basis, the site's cleanup would commence
independently. Concern over cleanup ability is a source of
contention among community and business groups. Divorcing- this
facet from the process allows a more amicable relationship between
businesses and grass roots organizations, both of which are
essential to the revitalization of brownfields.
D. Brownfields that Won 't
The final category of Brownfields refers to sites that, at the
present time, are an impractical size, are situated in a poor location,
or are affected by a combination of other factors, which make the
parcel economically non-viable. Community groups must be
creative in imagining a use for the parcel to allow it to once again
contribute to the community. Cleanups would be performed to
return the parcel to a residential standard, in keeping with the goal
of providing property with as many options for use as possible for
future generations.
CONCLUSION
A parcel, which is valueless today, may not be so tomorrow.
Thirty years ago the Soho district in lower Manhattan was a dreary
industrial area. Today it is home to some of the most fashionable
locations in Manhattan. Cities like New York are living organisms
and are subject to dramatic changes. It is our responsibility to leave
our children with as many options for land use as possible.
When considering this complex legal and political anomaly, I
realize that the amount of insight and dedication currently devoted
to providing solutions for the brownfields crisis is truly
extraordinary. It is my hope that the observations in this writing
may contribute, in some small way, toward the creation of a
sensitive and intelligent resolution of the complex brownfields
dilemma. In adversity may lay buried a significant and
transformative wisdom. For it has been said, "sweet are the uses of
adversity, Which like the toad, ugly and venomous, Wears yet a
precious jewel in his head; And this is our life, exempt from public
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haunt, Finds tongues in trees, books in the running brooks,
Sermons in stones, and good in everything."' 170
170. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, As You LIKE IT, act 2, sc. 1.

